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Abstract: Child benefit is a universal payment to all households with children in 
Ireland.  Unlike other transfers however it is paid to the mother.  This paper 
analyses expenditure patterns out of this transfer payment and compares them to 
expenditure patterns from other sources of income using the Irish Household 
Budget Survey.  This throws light on within household resource allocation and 
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Using Irish Data 
 
1. Introduction: 
Child Benefit in Ireland is unlike most other transfer payments in two respects.  First, it 
is a universal non means-tested payment made to all families with children.  Children are 
defined as normally living with, and being supported by, their parents/guardian and aged 
under 16 or else aged 16, 17 or 18 and in full-time education or physically or mentally 
disabled.  The second unusual feature regarding child benefit is that it is normally paid to the 
child's mother or step-mother. If the child does not live with the mother or step-mother, 
then it may be paid to the child's father or step-father who is living with and supporting the 
child. 
The combination of these two factors implies that analysis of child benefit and the 
pattern of expenditure from child benefit can throw light on a number of features of 
interest.  The first of these concerns the issue of within household allocation.  Much 
economic analysis treats the family as the unit of measurement and little attention is paid to 
the allocation of resources within the household.  This is the so-called “unitary” model of 
household decision-making.  In recent years alternative models of household decision-
making have appeared, the “collective” model, which allow for different interests within the 
household so that ownership of income may affect the pattern of its use (see Chiappori, 
1992 and Browning et al., 1994).  Since child benefit is paid to the mother then analysis of 
how it is spent may shed light on the degree to which ownership of a source of income may 
affect its use.  Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) show how in the UK a change in the 
payment of child benefit from fathers to mothers led to increased expenditure on children’s 
clothing (although at the same time the form of payment changed from a tax credit to a 
direct payment, so it is difficult to discriminate between the effects of the two different 
changes).  In a similar vein Phipps and Burton (1998) show the different influence of male 
and female incomes on patterns of household expenditures.  They find that an extra unit of 
female income is more likely to be spent on childcare or children’s clothing than is an extra 
unit of male income. 
The second feature of interest concerns expenditure patterns according to different 
sources of income.  There is some evidence from the US that expenditure out of certain   3 
sources of income e.g. AFDC welfare payments, differs from that from other income 
sources (see Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).  For example, Del Boca and Flinn (1994) show that 
propensities to spend on children’s goods differ for child support and alimony payments 
compared to general income.  Knox (1996) shows that child support payments appear to 
have a greater effect on children’s educational attainment than other sources of income.  
This contradicts the idea that “a dollar is a dollar is a dollar” since there seems to be no a 
priori reason why labelling should affect the uses to which money is put.  It could be argued 
that the results of Del Boca and Flinn and Knox are due to the fact that there will be a high 
degree of monitoring of the spending of child support payments by the payer (the parent 
who is not awarded custody of the child).  This will not be the case for child benefit where 
the payer is the state.  Should we observe that spending out of child benefit differs from 
spending from other sources of income, then the nature of this difference may indicate the 
extent to which this targetted benefit is fulfilling its aim.  For example, if the propensity to 
consume “child-intensive” goods such as food or children’s clothing is higher from child 
benefit than other sources of income then it seems reasonable to infer that children do gain 
disproportionately from child benefit. The universality of child benefit lends itself in 
particular to the analysis of this issue since it implies that apart from the obvious difference 
of having children, families receiving child benefit should be reasonably representative of the 
population at large. 
This may have important policy implications.  Say, for example, governments regard 
spending on children’s education as a “merit” good, something which they wish to 
encourage.  They could choose to directly put resources into children’s education by building 
bigger and better equipped schools or hiring more teachers.  Or they could choose to give a 
payment to parents which is intended to be spent on children’s education.  The problem 
with the latter approach of course is that there is no guarantee that the payment will be spent 
on children’s education and not on other non-merit goods, unless the labelling of a source of 
income affects expenditure patterns from that source of income. 
Rottman (1994) has examined some of these issues for Ireland.  He uses a sample of 625  
households who were part of a follow-up to a major survey carried out by the Economic and 
Social Research Institute in 1987.  He finds that the source of income appears to be 
important from the point of view of sharing of resources.  Households with income derived 
mainly from social welfare sources share about 33% of their income compared with an   4 
average of about 63% for other households.  With regard to child benefit households appear 
to divide fairly evenly between those who use it for general household spending and those 
who use it for child specific goods.  That breakdown is sensitive however to who controls 
the spending of child benefit.  Where it is jointly controlled there is a significantly lower 
proportion spent on children’s goods as opposed to the case where the wife controls child 
benefit.  He also finds that when asked how a windfall increase of £20 per month in 
household income would be spent, 18% of wives listed children’s clothing as a priority as 
opposed to 10% of husbands.  The analysis in this paper provides an alternative 
methodology for analysing similar issues to those of Rottman and the results make an 
interesting comparison. 
Although we have discussed intrahousehold allocation of resources and differential 
spending patterns from different sources of income as though they are two separate issues, it 
is likely that they are related.  A transfer payment such as child benefit is paid to families 
with children since it is presumably intended to improve the welfare of children (we discuss 
this further below). It is paid to the mother since it is believed that this increases the 
probability that it will “hit” its target i.e. there is a higher probability that the mother will 
spend the transfer on child-intensive goods than is the case with the father. But this 
presumes that following the payment there is no adverse (from the point of view of the 
child) intrahousehold resource reallocation.  Thus targetted payments and within household 
resource allocation are closely related.
1  In particular, the extent to which intrahousehold 
resource reallocation takes place can make a difference in terms of who ultimately benefits 
from a programme relying on an indicator such as the presence of children to target 
transfers. 
It may also be the case that child benefit is particularly intended to address child poverty.  
In this paper we examine the extent to which child benefit combats child poverty by 
analysing whether the extent to which children do better out of child benefit is independent 
of total resources. 
We propose to analyse this issue by examining expenditure patterns on goods which are 
clearly assignable as “children’s goods”.  By examining expenditure patterns on these goods 
from different sources of income, we can estimate the extent to which child benefit hits its 
target.  We also examine how the “accuracy” of child benefit differs according to family   5 
resources. We analyse this issue using the Irish Household Budget Surveys of 1987 and1994.  
These are nationally representative surveys carried out at seven year intervals and which 
collect a variety of information concerning the consumption patterns, income and 
demographic characteristics of in excess of 7000 households. 
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe our 
methodology in more detail and present and discuss our results.  In section 3 we examine 




We propose to analyse how the accuracy of targetted child benefits differs by household 
income by examining a variety of Engel curves.  The Engel curve gives the relationship 
between expenditure on a good and some underlying measure of household resources 
(typically income or expenditure) conditional on other household characteristics.  Thus a 
very general specification for an Engel curve is  ) ; (
h h h
i Z M f x = where 
h
i x is expenditure by 
household h on good i, 
h M is household income/expenditure (we discuss which of these 
measures is preferable below) and 
h Z is a vector of relevant household characteristics. 
We propose to examine Engel curves for goods which are clearly assignable as children’s 
goods.  Household based surveys typically give total household expenditures on a variety of 
goods but it is usually impossible to infer the consumption of any individual member.  By 
“assignable” we mean a private good for which we can observe individual consumption.  We 
will examine Engel curves for children’s clothing (we have information on boy’s and girl’s 
clothing).  Strictly speaking children’s clothing is not an assignable good since in the case of 
more than one child of either gender it may not be possible to infer which child is 
consuming.
2  We will examine Engel curves on these goods for different component parts of 
household resources e.g. total household expenditure, child benefit and also disposable 
income of individual parents/guardians.  We also examine how it differs across the 
distribution of expenditure by repeating our analysis for different quartiles of expenditure.  
                                                                                                                                            
1 See Haddad and Kanbur (1992). 
2 It is also possible that a small adult might purchase children’s clothing for themselves and not report it as 
adult clothing.     6 
We are then in a position to examine whether the degree to which child benefit distributes 
resources towards children is sensitive to total household resources.
3 
Before discussing our Engel curve specification we discuss the appropriate measure of 
household resources to use.  The choice is between total household expenditure and 
disposable household income. Broadly the issues are as follows: certain components of 
income are difficult to measure e.g. income from self-employment.  Perhaps more 
importantly cross-section studies typically provide income measures which are snapshots in 
time and thus take no account of the difference between transitory and permanent income.  
Since consumption/expenditure decision are usually made with reference to permanent 
income then expenditure measures may be preferable.  However, such measures also have 
drawbacks.  Expenditure on items such as alcohol and tobacco are typically under-reported.  
Also, as discussed below, expenditure over a two-week period may not be a reliable measure 
of consumption, particularly for mature households who may have a large stock of durables 
from which they derive services. 
However a further problem specific to our data is that income observations are “top-
coded” i.e. values of income in excess of £800 per week are simply entered as £800 per 
week.  Thus the distribution of income is censored on the right hand side at a value of £800.  
This causes problems both when estimating Engel curves since higher spending on a good 
may be observed even though income is fixed at £800.  One way around this problem is to 
find an appropriate instrument for income and then use predicted income rather than actual 
income for the calculation of Engel curves based on incomes (the problem does not arise for 
expenditure).  Thus given appropriate instruments for income we can carry out a Tobit 
regression of income on these variables (reflecting the censoring of income at £800) and 
then use predicted income from this Tobit.  However, since the obvious candidate as an 
instrument for income is expenditure, it seems more sensible to simply use expenditure as 
the basis for estimating Engel curves.  Our expenditure measure is total expenditure 
excluding repayments of loans other than house purchase mortgages, savings and taxes.  It 
includes the value of home grown food consumed. 
                                                 
3 It could be argued that childen’s clothing is not an ideal assignable good, since informal networks between 
related families in terms of handing on children’s clothing may distort the relationship between consumption of 
clothing and recorded expenditure on clothing.  We carried out the same analysis for milk, which while not 
directly assignable, is presumably a good which is intensively consumed by children.  The qualitative results 
were practically identical.   7 
Since our analysis is based primarily upon comparison of Engel curves out of total 
household resources and child benefit, our specific choice of Engel curve is important.  As 
our principal specification we choose probably the simplest form of Engel curve, where 
spending on children’s clothing is a linear function of total household spending, child 
benefit, demographic variables and a dummy variable for 1987 (our data is pooled data from 
1987 and 1994).  Thus   87 5 4 3 2 1 0 D a NUMKID a NUMAD a CB a M a a x
h
cl + + + + + =  where 
h
cl x  is the expenditure by household h on children’s clothes, M is household resources, CB is 
child benefit, NUMAD is the number of adults in the family, NUMKID is the number of 
children and  87 D is a dummy variable for 1987.  The core of our analysis then is testing the 
proposition that  2 1 a a = .  Note that a specification such as the one above assumes that 
Engel curves for children’s clothing estimated on all households are linear out of all sources 
of income.  This then implies that the marginal propensity to spend on children’s clothes out 
of a given source of income is independent of income.  If the Engel curve is convex then the 
MPC is increasing in income while if it is concave it is decreasing. 
If we adopt the specification for Engel curves suggested by Working and Leser 
(henceforth WL), where the budget share of a good is dependent upon the log of total 
expenditure, i.e.  M b a wi log + = , then linearity of the Engel curve implies that the 
coefficient on the log of total expenditure is zero, since it implies that the budget share 
allocated to that good is independent of total spending.
4  A positive coefficient implies that 
the good is a luxury while a negative coefficient implies it is a necessity.
5 
When choosing the WL specification for this study the comparison of the coefficients 
on total expenditure and child benefit is complicated slightly.  Given a W-L Engel curve of 
the type  87 5 4 3 2 1 0 log log D a NUMKID a NUMAD a CB a M a a w
h
cl + + + + + = , then the 



















 respectively.  Since M always exceeds CB, a finding 
                                                 
4 This specification has the advantage that it has a basis in utility theory unlike the more ad hoc linear and log 
specifications.  
5 Note we are assuming that WL Engel curves are “linear” in the sense that we are not including higher order 
terms in expenditure (in which case goods can be necessities at some levels of income and luxuries at others 
(see Blundell and Duncan (1998) and Blundell, Pashardes and Weber (1993).   8 
that  2 a exceeds  1 a  must imply a stronger marginal effect of child benefit on the budget share 
of children’s clothing. 
An attractive specification which is consistent with the WL Engel curve and yet permits 
direct comparison of the marginal impact of total expenditure and child benefit is  
87 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) log( D a NUMKID a NUMAD a CB a M a a w
h
cl + + + + + = . 


























.  Since the denominators are the same, the test 
for a stronger impact of child benefit is the test that  1 2 > a  (alternatively if  0 1 < a  we test 
that  1 2 - < a ).
6 
Thus in general there are three specifications we can examine: there is the very basic 
Engel curve which is linear in total spending and child benefit and demographic dummies, 
there is the basic WL specification and there is the “non-linear” version introduced above.  
We will present results for all three specifications. 
We now give the relevant summary statistics for the households we analyse.  Out of a 
total sample of 15582 households (7705 from 1987 and 7877 from 1994), there are 6650 
with children of whom 6606 who are in receipt of child benefit.
7  Table 1 lists the number of 
children in the relevant households, while table 2 gives summary information regarding total 
expenditure, spending on children’s clothes etc. 
Table 1:  Number of Children for Households with Children 
Number of Children  Number  % 
1  2126  32.18 
2  2173  32.89 
3  1371  20.75 
4 or greater  936  14.18 
Total  6606  100 
 
                                                 
6 I am grateful to Kevin Denny for this suggestion. 
7 For the purposes of our analysis here we only consider children aged 14 or less.  This is because it is possible 
that a reasonable number of children aged over 14 would purchase adult clothing and so we cannot accurately 
assign a good to them.   9 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Households with Children (N=6606, IR£1994) 




(0.027)           
0.021  
(0.036)          
0.025 
(0.037)            
0.031 
(0.045) 
 Total Expenditure  346.66  
(203.88)          
336.21  
(184.99)          
339.73  
(194.70)           
336.48 
(187.27) 
 Child Benefit  6.93  
(3.61)          
10.65  
(3.40)          
15.15 




There are a number of features of tables 1 and 2 worth noting.  First, the majority of 
households (over 65%) have only one or two children.  Secondly, as we would expect the 
budget share for children’s clothing is increasing in the number of children.  There is 
remarkably little variation in average total expenditure across families with different numbers 
of children.  However, when carrying out analysis across different households it is customary 
to adjust the resources available to each household to take account of varying size and 
composition.  There is an extensive literature on the appropriate choice of equivalence scale 
(see Lewbel, 1999, for a recent discussion) and the one we employ is a scale which has been 
widely used in various studies in the EU.  It is the same as scale “C” used by Callan et al 
(1996) and is also used by O’Neill and Sweetman (1998).    The weights are 1 for the first 
adult in the household, 0.7 for additional people aged over 14 and 0.5 for people aged less 
than 14.  Table 2A replicates table 2 except that we now [present results for equivalised 
expenditure and equivalised child benefit. 
Table 2A: Summary Statistics (with Equivalence Scale applied) for Households 
with Children (N=6606, IR£1994) 






















 When applying this equivalence scale we find that larger families on average have less 
resources per equivalent adult.  Finally table 2A shows that equivalised child benefit rises   10
with family size.  This is because child benefit will rise commensurate with the number of 
children, while each additional child adds only 0.5 to the number of equivalent adults.   For 
the analysis in this paper we use non-equivalised total expenditure and child benefit 
measures but qualitatively the results are the same with equivalised data (and are available 
upon request from the author). 
However, for many of our households we do not observe any purchase of children’s 
clothing.  This is the issue of “infrequency of purchase” which is quite a common 
occurrence in data sets such as the HBS where households are asked to record their 
expenditure over a certain period of time.  For goods which can be regarded as durable or 
semi-durable it is possible that during that period of time no purchases are observed 
although of course the household is still consuming the services of the good in question.  
Thus the figures in table 1 for budget share are almost certainly downward biased.  The 
relevant summary statistics for those households who are observed to purchase children’s 
clothing are given in tables 1A and 2A.  There are 3233 households for whom no purchase 
of children’s clothing is observed thus leaving 3373 in tables 1A and 2B. 
Table 1A:  Number of Children for Households with Children who Purchase 
Children’s Clothing 
Number of Children  Number  % 
1  802  23.78 
2  1157  34.30 
3  809  23.98 
4 or greater  605  17.94 
Total  3373  100 
 
However, this sample of 3373 households also may not be representative for a further 
related reason. It could be argued that households that are observed to purchase children’s 
clothing during the period for which the HBS records are kept are likely to be houses which 
on average purchase children’s clothes more frequently.  If this arises because they are 
households with a greater preference for children’s clothes then the budget share figures in 
table 2A may be biased upward.  An alternative way to express this is that households may 
not be randomly allocated into those who are observed to purchase and those who are   11
observed not to purchase i.e. there is selection bias in terms of those households observed to 
purchase children’s clothing. 
Table 2A: Summary Statistics for Households with Children  Purchasing 
Children’s Clothing(N=3373, IR£1994) 
This raises important issues regarding which is the appropriate sample to use for 
econometric analysis.  The use of the complete sample of 6606 households with about 50% 
of the sample recording zero consumption of children’s clothing is almost certainly not 
appropriate since it seriously under-records consumption for these households.  So are we 
entitled to use the abbreviated sample of 3373 households?  We carried out the econometric 
analysis for the abbreviated sample on its own and also for the complete sample treating the 
zeros as missing observations and controlling for selection bias via the well-known Heckman 
twostep procedure.
8  In no case was the coefficient on the selection bias term significant and 
there was very little difference between the coefficients on the other variables regardless of 
whether or not we corrected for selection bias.   This indicates that selection bias is not a 
problem and so for the remainder of this paper the analysis is carried out for the sample of 
3373 households observed to purchase children’s clothing. 
One problem which arises when carrying out the analysis for child benefit is the 
difficulty of identifying the separate effects of child benefit and that of more children.  We 
have pooled data from 1987 and 1994, thus there is variation in child benefit from both a 
time-series and cross-section source.  However, the variation from the cross-section source 
arises from having more children, which in itself would tend to affect spending on children’s 
clothing.  We can control for this in one of two ways, either by having the number of 
children (and the number of adults) as additional right-hand side regressors or by carrying 
                                                 
8 These results are available on request from the author. 






























(0.67)   12
out the analysis conditional on the number of children aged less than 14.  In the former case 
there is a risk of multicollinearity, since the number of children and total child benefit are  
obviously highly correlated.  In the latter case, there is no-cross-section variation and we are 
relying solely upon time-series variation to identify the effect of child benefit.  Thus for the 
analysis out of child benefit we carry out separate analysis for the results are the same and 
thus we are reasonably confident that the results reported are robust.   Table 3 gives the 
simplest form of Engel curve where spending on children’s clothing is regressed against total 
expenditure, child benefit and dummies for number of children, number of adults and 1987 
are included.  We also include the F test for the equality of coefficient between total 
expenditure and child benefit families with one, two, three and greater than three children.  
It turns out that qualitatively  
Table 3: Engel Curves for Children’s Clothing from Total Expenditure and Child 
Benefit 
The results are supportive of the idea that children do better out of child benefit than 
out of total expenditure in the sense that the MPC on children’s clothing is greater and this 
difference is statistically significant.  When estimating conditional on the number of children 
the effect is less pronounced (except for the case of two children).  In the other cases the 




N=3373  N=802  N=1157  N=809  N=605 
No. Children  n.a.  1  2  3  >3 




.0221036**   
(.0032266) 
.0235034**   
(.0059695) 
.0437158**   
(.0061207) 






.2722643   
(.2308851) 






-  -  -  - 






-24.54476   
(81.38566) 
-130.5345   
(100.7451) 




-121.7038   
(78.87822) 




F Test  15.80**  0.68  10.14**  1.18  1.34   13
What about the WL Engel curves?  In table 4 we present estimates for the 
conventionally estimated WL curves i.e. linear estimation with total expenditure as the 
denominator for the budget share term and in table 5 we present estimates for the “non-
linear” version. 
Table 4: Working-Leser Engel Curves for Children’s Clothing from Total 
Expenditure and Child Benefit 
 
 These results are in agreement with those in table 3.  For the linear version of the WL 
Engel curve, the coefficient on child benefit is higher than that for total expenditure and in 
all cases the difference is statistically significant.  Note also that the negative coefficient on 
total expenditure suggests that children’s clothing are a necessity out of total expenditure and 
a luxury out of child benefit.  The results for the non-linear version in table 5 are not as 
clearcut, but in general they are supportive of those in table 4.  Recall that in this case, given 
that the coefficient on total expenditure is always negative, we require that the coefficient on 
child benefit be negative and greater than one.  The difference in coefficients is always in the 
expected direction (except for the case of greater than three children) but only where there 






N=3373  N=802  N=1157  N=809  N=605 
No. Children  n.a.  1  2  3  >3 
Total Exp. 
(log) 
-.0112508**   
(.0014343) 




-.0138555**   
(.0025953) 




.0139269**   
(.0026807) 




.0194971   
(.0103925) 




-.0011704   
(.0011925) 
-  -  -  - 
No. of Adults  -.0026474**   
(.0006867) 




-.0025513   
(.0017644) 
-.002907   
(.0022251) 




.0033399   
(.0029886) 
.0019821    
(.004765) 
-.0083138   
(.0057267) 
F Test  66.89**  23.83**  28.14**  10.21**  2.28   14
Table 4: “Non-Linear” Working-Leser Engel Curves for Children’s Clothing from 
Total Expenditure and Child Benefit 
 
So far our results are supportive of the idea that children do better out of child benefit 
than they do out of total expenditure.  But is this effect uniform across the distribution of 
expenditure?  This is particularly relevant if child benefit is intended as a means of relieving 
child poverty, since the presumed intention is that children in poor households should gain 
from child benefit.  In table 6a-6c we replicate the analysis of tables 3-5 for different 
quartiles of the distribution of equivalised expenditure.  These tables suggest that the 
differences in coefficients between total expenditure and child benefit are greatest at the 
highest quartile.  The results are slightly different depending upon whether we use the simple 
Engel curve or the WL version.  Both the linear and non-linear versions of the WL curve 
show a significant difference between the coefficients for the second and fourth quartile, 
while the simple version also shows a significant difference at the first quartile.  In no cases 






N=3373  N=802  N=1157  N=809  N=605 





















-5.797414   
(4.899982) 






-  -  -  - 
No. of Adults  .0000695   
(.0004975) 
.0013817   
(.0007317) 
-1.32e-06   
(.0007915) 
.0006608   
(.0009828) 
-.0030774   
(.0018782) 
1987  -.0056343**   
(.0011747) 




-.0018805   
.0023414 
-.0115042   
(.0039382) 
F Test (co-eff 
on child 
benefit=1) 
0.02  0.76  4.68**  4.80**  -21.48   15
children benefit from child benefit proportionately more in richer households.  However, 
this finding should be interpreted with caution.  While children in better off families may do 
relatively better from child benefit than those in poor families this does not imply that 
children in poor families do not gain from child benefit, nor that it does not alleviate child 
poverty in these families.  It may also be the case that child benefit is spent differently in 
poorer households, perhaps upon non-assignable goods which are still consumed relatively 
intensively by children.
9 
As outlined above our results can be explained on the basis that family resources are not 
pooled and that the specific person receiving a given source of income will affect spending 
patterns.  Alternatively, the labelling of a source of income affects spending patterns from  
 
Table 6a: Engel Curves for Children’s Clothing from Total Expenditure and 
Child Benefit for Different Quartiles 
                                                 
9 When we carried out the same analysis for milk, we found that the difference in coefficients for total 





N=844  N=842  N=843  N=844 
Quartile  1  2  3  4 
Total Exp.  .0535079** 
(.0077434) 
.0195726   
(.0164162) 
















-20.97046   
(104.8817) 
37.44815   
( 174.1443) 
-110.1499   
(194.9117) 
No. of Adults  -197.8831** 
(45.87461) 
-77.52782   
(115.4676) 
-233.5482   
(186.2819) 
-100.2566   
(115.0726) 
1987  -106.7603   
(81.98111) 
-25.68603   
(86.44269) 
-252.877 *   
(115.0573) 
-234.1393   
(129.4672) 
F Test  8.26**  7.17**  1.17  6.26*   16
Table 6b: WL Engel Curves for Children’s Clothing from Total Expenditure and 
Child Benefit for Different Quartiles 
Table 6c: “Non-Linear” WL Engel Curves for Children’s Clothing from Total 
Expenditure and Child Benefit for Different Quartiles 
Dep Var=share  
Children’s 
Clothing 
N=844  N=842  N=843  N=844 
Quartile  1  2  3  4 
Total Exp. 
(log) 




-.0046779   
(.0127382) 












No. of Children  -.0053627* 
(.0025459) 
.0019481   
(.0023738) 
.0040601   
(.0031143) 
-.0000469   
(.0026153) 
No. of Adults  -.0063097 **  
(.0018102) 
.0004542   
(.0024887) 
-.0016527   
(.0028288) 
.0000316   
(.0013751) 
1987  -.008141* 
(.0038974) 
-.0021787   
(.0028125) 
-.0066151   
(.0027572) 
-.0051201   
(.0021315) 
F Test  2.00  9.19**  0.37  19.85** 
Dep Var=share  
Children’s 
Clothing 
N=844  N=842  N=843  N=844 
Quartile  1  2  3  4 
Total Exp. 
(log) 




-8.58e-07**    
(3.02e-07) 




-1.129631   
(2.053842) 
-4.139162   
(2.193443) 




No. of Children  -7.16e-08   
(1.12e-07) 
5.72e-08   
(8.21e-08) 
-1.91e-08   
(5.27e-08) 
-1.62e-08   
(2.51e-08) 




-1.50e-07   
(6.42e-08) 
-5.49e-08   
(3.49e-08) 




8.23e-08   
(5.76e-08) 
-1.62e-08**   
(2.51e-08) 
F Test  0.13  3.14*  1.56  18.37**   17
that source and it is not the case that “a dollar is a dollar is a dollar”.  How can we 
distinguish between these two competing hypotheses?  One potential way is if we can find 
another way of assigning a given source of income within the household, or more 
particularly to either the father or the mother.  The HBS does distinguish between income of 
the “head of the household” and that of other members of the household.  We also know 
the gender of the head of the household.  We assumed that where the gender of the head of 
household was male this income could be regarded as “husbands income” and the income of 
the spouse of the head would then be “wife’s income”.  The situation would be reversed 
where the gender of the head of the household was female.  Thus if we observe that 
spending patterns on children’s clothing is independent of whose income it comes from, this 
will support the labelling hypothesis.  If however we observe that such spending patterns are 
not independent of the person receiving the income, then we will still be unable to 
distinguish between the two competing hypotheses. 
In table 7 we present simple and WL Engel curves for children’s clothing out of 
husband’s disposable income and wife’s disposable income.  We do not carry out the 
estimation conditional on the number of children since in this case we are not interested in 
variation due to child benefit. 
Taking the simple Engel curve first, the coefficient on wife’s income is smaller than the 
coefficient on husband’s income though the difference is not significant.
10  This indicates 
that there is the same propensity to spend on children’s clothing out of husbands income as 
there is out of wives’ income.  This is evidence in favour of the labelling view regarding child 
benefit, since if the higher propensity to spend on children’s clothing out of child benefit 
was due to the fact that it is paid to the mother, then we would expect to see this also 
reflected in a higher propensity to spend out of wives’ (i.e. mothers’) incomes.
11  The 
evidence for the WL Engel curves appears to less clearcut at first sight.  For the linear 
version the coefficient on wives’ income is higher and the F test appears to be significant at 
conventional levels.  However, recall that the marginal impact upon the budget share is given 
by the coefficient deflated by the average value of husbands’ (wives’) income.  Since 
                                                 
10 Note that we cannot carry out this analysis for total expenditure since we have no way of separately 
identifying husbands’ and wives’ expenditure. 
11 The measure of income used here is “disposable income”.  The results are robust to the use of earned 
income and also to when we restrict the sample to households where both parents are earning.  It is also robust 
to the inclusion of a dummy variable for labour force participation by the wife.   18
husbands’ income exceeds wives’ income the adjusted difference is smaller, though the 
coefficient on wives’ income is still greater (i.e. less negative).  The ratio of the (absolute 
value) of the unadjusted coefficient on husbands’ income to that on wives’ income is 2.5, 
while the ratio for the adjusted figure is 1.3.   For the non-linear case the wives’ coefficient is 
0.5 and the relevant F statistic is 0.5.  Thus overall the evidence is tentatively supportive of 
the labelling hypothesis. 
Table 7:  Engel curves for Children’s Clothing out of Husbands’ and Wives’ 




















-.101487**   
(.0032586) 




-.0027923**   
(.0006831) 
.5009208**   
(3.25e-06) 
No. of Kids  172.341**   
(26.24896) 
No. of Kids  .0044821** 
(.0008664) 
.0090641**   
(.0017173) 
No. of Adults  112.912** 
(23.78363) 




1987  -298.0241** 
(56.68648) 




F Test  0.99  F Test  5.87  0.50 
 
Simple tests of the unitary household model by examining expenditure patterns out of 
husbands and wives income sources have been criticised on the basis that such differences 
may not reflect differences in preferences but rather differences in relevant prices.  For 
example, husbands and wives relative earned incomes will reflect differing labour supplies 
which will in turn reflect different opportunity costs of time.  Thus, for example, a finding 
that wives’ income is more directed towards, say restaurant meals than husbands’ may not 
reflect different preferences but rather that in those households with higher female incomes 
the opportunity cost of home prepared meals is higher.  Can such a criticism be directed at   19
our analysis here?  If we accept that in those households with relatively higher female 
incomes that the opportunity cost of female time is higher then since clothes purchasing 
comes from leisure time, there is a lower probability of the female in those households 
purchasing children’s clothes.  Thus the lower propensity to spend on children’s clothes out 
of female income may not reflect preferences, but rather a higher opportunity cost of non-
work activities, including shopping.  And so the fact that children do relatively better out of 
child benefit may be explained by the fact that it is paid to the mother rather than the 
labelling view.  Thus overall the evidence here in favour of the labelling view must be 
tempered by the realisation that different households may face different opportunity costs of 
leisure and this may lie behind their different consumption patterns.  This will certainly be 
the case if there is not weak separability between goods and leisure (see Browning and 
Meghir, 1991, for tests of weak separability). 
Note also that the evidence in table 8 is not necessarily in favour of the unitary 
household model since propensities to consume are still different for husbands’ and wives’ 
income.  However the direction of the difference is evidence in favour of the labelling view 
when it comes to trying to explain why children appear to do better out of child benefit than 
total expenditure. 
So far we have examined the relationship between spending on goods which are clearly 
assignable to children and different sources or definitions of income/expenditure.  The 
corollary of our finding that children do better out of child benefit is that adults do worse.  
Thus we carry out the same exercise for goods which are clearly assignable to adults. 
Examples of such goods are alcohol and tobacco.  However, because of the suspicion over 
reported consumption of alcohol and tobacco in survey based data it is worthwhile to 
instead examine adult clothing.  For reasons of brevity we will not reproduce all the analysis 
for adults clothing.  Instead we merely redo tables 3, 4 and 5 for adult clothing. 
These results are almost the mirror image of the results for children’s clothing.  The 
propensity to consume out of total expenditure is well in excess of that to consume out of 
child benefit and this difference is significant.  The WL Engel curves indicate that adult 
clothing is a luxury out of total expenditure but a necessity out of child benefit.  To 
economise on the number of tables we present, we omit the regressions conditional on the 
number of children (the results for these specifications are qualitatively similar to those in   20
table 8, although there is some evidence that the negative effect on adults clothing out of 
child benefit is larger for bigger families). 
Thus there is reasonably strong evidence that the corollary to our main finding of 
children doing relatively better out of child benefit than out of total expenditure (that adults 
do relatively worse) holds when we examine adult clothing. 
Table 8:  Engel curves for Adults’ Clothing out of Total Expenditure and Child 




“Simple” Version  WL Linear Version  WL Non-linear 
Version 










-3.371823*   
(1.617973) 
No. of Kids  318.04   
(185.1556) 
.0029413   
(.0023593) 
-.0002919   
(.0010345) 












F Test  8.08**  32.77**  4.371823* 
 
 
3. Does Gender Matter? 
So far we have established that there is evidence that children do benefit from child 
benefit, in the sense that propensities to consume children’s clothes are higher from child 
benefit than from general expenditure.  We have also seen that, following examination of 
expenditure patterns from husbands’ and wives’ income, it appears that this may be due to 
the “labelling” effect, as opposed to the fact that child benefit is paid to the mother.  We 
now investigate whether this phenomenon differs according to gender i.e. given that children 
do benefit from child benefit is this effect more pronounced for boys than for girls.
12 
                                                 
12 Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1986) investigate parental preferences over human capital investments in 
their children and find no evidence of unequal concern between boys and girls.   21
In this section we essentially repeat the analysis of section 2 except that now our 
dependent variable is the ratio of the budget share for boys clothing to that for girls clothing.  














, .  
Note that in this case the coefficient on total expenditure will not tell us anything about 
whether children’s clothing is a luxury or a necessity.  Instead it tells us how the relative 
budget shares spent on boys and girls clothing is affected by total expenditure/child benefit.  
According to the null hypothesis we expect the coefficient on child benefit (and total 
expenditure) to have  values of zero i.e. relative budget shares should be independent of total 
expenditure. 
Table 9: Engel Curves for Ratio of Boys and Girls clothes from Total Expenditure 
and Child Benefit 
Dep Var=Ratio of  
boys/girls clothes 
N=562  (controlling for 
age of children) 
N=352 
N=562  (controlling for 
age of children) 
N=352 
Total Exp.  8.32e-06   
(8.18e-06) 
9.21e-06    
(.000012) 
   
Total Exp (log)      .4714604   
(.3122338) 
.5485223   
(.4327099) 
Child Benefit  .0004364   
(.0004261) 
.0005002   
(.0005457) 
   
Child Benefit (log)      1.395316* 
(.639154) 
1.606831   
(.8515641) 
Num Kids  -.0889813   
(.3020991) 
.008979   
(.5213999) 
-.3168154   
(.2571815) 
-.286389   
(.4733954) 
Num Adults  -.3199481   
(.1634043) 






1987  -.1167937   
(.2348601) 
-.2817255   
(.3026689) 
.0065406   
(.2445768) 
-.1448225   
(.3142146) 
F Test  1.02  0.83  2.56  2.23   22
In tables 9 we present Engel curves where the dependent variable is the ratio of budget 
shares (we drop the non-linear version since the denominator of the budget share drops out 
of the expression for the dependent variable).  We restrict our sample to those households 
where there are equal numbers of boys and girls.  We also control for the possibility that 
different budget shares devoted to boys and girls clothes may be a function of the different 
ages of boys and girls in a family (e.g. the budget share for a fourteen year old boy may be 
higher that that for a one year old girl) by only examining households where there are equal 
numbers of boys and girls in each age category (zero to four and five to fourteen). 
These tables throw some light upon two related but also distinct issues.  First there is the 
issue of direct interest to us here i.e. whether the extent to which children do “better” out of 
child benefit than total expenditure differs according to gender.  This we can determine by 
examining whether the coefficients on total expenditure and child benefit differ.  Secondly it 
gives us some idea of whether boys do better than girls out of general expenditure and/or 
child benefit.  This is determined by whether the coefficients on log total expenditure/child 
benefit differ from zero. 
The answer to the first question is that the difference in the coefficients on total 
expenditure and child benefit is not statistically significant although the P-value for the case 
where age is controlled for is around 0.1.  So there is some weak evidence that boys may be 
disproportionately favoured when age is controlled for.   
Regarding whether boys or girls do better in general out of total expenditure and/or 
child benefit for total expenditure, only in one case is the coefficient significantly different 
from zero (the WL version where age is not controlled for, although the P-value on the 
significance of this coefficient where age is being controlled for is only just above 0.05).   
Thus once again there is some evidence of boys doing better.  We must remember however 
that our measure of the extent to which boys do better than girls is the ratio of budget shares 
on clothes and it is possible that there are compensating differences in budget shares for 
other goods, but these cannot be detected from our data since they are not assignable goods. 
Finally, as a further test of discrimination in favour of one gender or the other, and 
following the methodology of Deaton (1989), we tested whether the budget share devoted to 
adult goods (in this case adult clothing and alcohol and tobacco) is influenced by the ratio of  
boys to girls, controlling for the total number of children in the household.  A negative 
coefficient on the ratio of boys to girls (while simultaneously controlling for the number of   23
children) indicates less spending on adult goods (and presumably more spending on 
children’s goods) when there is a higher proportion of male children.  The coefficient on the 
ratio of boys to girls is negative and significant for the simple version of the Engel curve and 
the non-linear version of the WL Engel curve.  So, once again, we see some evidence of 
discrimination in favour of boys. 
 
Table 10:  Engel curves for Adults’ Clothing out of Total Expenditure and Child 




“Simple” Version  WL Linear Version  WL Non-linear 
Version 






Child Benefit   -.9313193* 
(.4271626) 




No. of Kids  416.4129  
(252.9125) 














-.0098408**   
(.0023513) 
Boy/Girl  -130.8313*   
(61.68522) 






4. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has examined data from the Irish Household Budget Surveys of 1987 and 
1994 to investigate the extent to which children benefit from the payment of child benefit.  
Patterns of expenditure on children’s clothing out of child benefit have been compared with 
those out of total expenditure and it appears that at the margin a higher share of child 
benefit is allocated to this assignable good than is the case with total expenditure.  We also 
investigated whether this was due to the labelling of child benefit as a transfer which should 
be specifically spent on children’s goods or whether it was due to the fact that child benefit   24
is paid to the mother.  The evidence on spending patterns on children’s goods out of the 
incomes of the head of the household and his/her spouse indicates no statistically significant 
difference, suggesting that the success of child benefit is due to its labelling as a payment to 
be devoted to children, rather than owing to the identity of the recipient.  However, this is 
not conclusive evidence in favour of the labelling view since this may reflect differing prices 
facing mothers and fathers as opposed to different preferences.  We also found that the 
extent to which children benefited from child benefit was by and large independent of 
gender although there is some more general evidence of discrimination in favour of boys. 
The policy conclusion arising from this analysis is that the specific labelling of state 
transfers may be important in terms of their targeting, in this case maybe even more 
important than targeting the recipient of the payment.  In this sense it is not the case that “a 
dollar is a dollar is a dollar”.  This has implications for other state transfers in such areas as 
health and education. 
However, it is best to be cautious in interpreting these findings.  We have taken spending 
on children’s clothes as our “indicator” of child benefit.  It is possible that parents allocate 
expenditure so that spending on say, children’s food, at the margin takes up a greater share 
of total expenditure than of child benefit i.e. they offset spending on different children’s 
goods.  Or alternatively that husbands and wives take responsibility for different spheres of 
children’s goods e.g. mothers purchase clothing but fathers pay for school fees and school 
books.  We carried out similar analysis for school fees and voluntary contributions to 
schools and obtained similar results in terms of higher propensities to spend out of child 
benefit than total expenditure but the number of recorded observations (given the presence 
of “free” education) was too small for any robust inference. 
A further finding of this paper is that child benefit may not directly combat child 
poverty, in the sense that it appears that the extent to which children do relatively better out 
of child benefit is greater amongst better-off families.  Once again, this finding should be 
interpreted with caution.  While children in better off families may do relatively better from 
child benefit than those in poor families this does not imply that children in poor families do 
not gain from child benefit, nor that it does not alleviate child poverty in these families. 
Overall, while the results presented in this paper are relatively tentative, they do suggest 
that child benefit is successful in that it does help children.  Our results also provide some   25
support for the idea that the labelling of specific benefits may be of use in terms of helping 
them reach their intended target.   26
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